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nated. From the vantage point of the car owner, legal defenses to the
garageman's claim no longer need to be "relegated to the dustbin." 7
GEORGE W. CHESROW
THE RIGHT TO VOTE-EQUAL PROTECTION
FOR STUDENTS
Plaintiff, a student at North Texas State University in Denton
County, Texas, made application to the County Assessor and Collector
of Taxes to register to vote. Pursuant to a Texas statute,1 plaintiff was
asked whether he intended to make his home in Denton County indefi-
nitely after he ceased to be a student. When he replied that he had no
such intentions, the county official refused to register him. On behalf of
himself and all others similarly situated, the student brought suit in
federal district court seeking a declaration that the statute was uncon-
stitutional. The lower court held that the suit was properly maintainable
as a class action,2 and declared the statute invalid under the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.8 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit,
held, affirmed: A requirement that a student intend to remain at the place
where he attends school after he concludes his studies is an improper
exercise of the state's power to impose reasonable residence requirements
upon the right to vote. Whatley v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1973).
Shortly after the twenty-sixth amendmen to the United States Con-
stitution was enacted, the nation's estimated eleven million' newly en-
37. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 123 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
1. Tax. Rzv. Civ. STAT. AN. art. 5.08(k) (Supp. 1972-73). The statute provides:
The residence of a student in a school, college, or university shall be construed to
be where his home was before he became such [a] student unless he has become a
bona fide resident of the place where he is living while attending school or of some
other place. A student shall not be considered to have acquired a residence at the
place where he lives while attending school unless he intends to remain there and to
make that place his home indefinitely after he ceases to be a student.
2. It was held that plaintiff represented a class that included "students who consider
their community their home but whose present intentions for the future either are unclear
or are not definite enough to reflect plans to move to another community after graduation."
Whatley v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230, 1231 n.2 (5th Cir. 1973).
3. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. "The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older,
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
age." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXVI, § 1.
5. Guido, Student Voting and Residency Qualifications: The Aftermath of the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 32, 38 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Student Voting].
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franchised voters began to register with their local election officials. Of
these eleven million potential new voters, approximately four and one-
half million were expected to be enrolled in institutions of higher learn-
ing.e The problem immediately arose as to whether students should be
permitted to vote in their local college community rather than the locality
wherein their parents resided.7
Approximately one-half of the states8 have constitutional or statu-
tory provisions relating to student residency requirements for voting
purposes.' Many of those states have interpreted these provisions as
creating a rebuttable presumption1° that the student came to the area
without the intent necessary to establish bona fide residency. 1
Statutory and constitutional provisions relating to student residency
requirements remained substantially unchallenged for decades.' 2 But in
the years just prior to and immediately subsequent to the enacting of the
twenty-sixth amendment, the United States Supreme Court began to show
great concern about the more restrictive burdens that states had imposed
upon the most basic of constitutional rights-the right to vote.'8 These
decisions proved to be the guiding light for subsequent federal and state
court decisions, such as Whatley, permitting students to register and
vote in their college communities. 4
In Carrington v. Rash,'15 the Supreme Court examined a provision
of the Texas constitution that absolutely prohibited nonresident service-
6. Id.
7. In most of the cases involving residency requirements as applied to students, the
courts invariably spoke of the elements commonly regarded as necessary for the acquisition
of domicile. The basic requirements include:
(1) physical presence at a particular place;
(2) legal capacity to change one's domicile; and
(3) the intention to effect such a change.
Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 797, 801-02 (1972).
8. Singer, Student Power at the Polls, 31 Omo ST. L.J. 703 (1970).
9. A typical provision reads:
For the purpose of registering and voting no person shall be deemed to have gained
or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence while employed in the service
of the United States . . . nor while a student of any institution of learning.
N.Y. ELEIoN LAw § 151 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73).
10. In a few jurisdictions, the presumption has been viewed as a conclusive one that
students cannot overcome. In other states, the student's presence in the college community
is regarded as a neutral factor in the determination of whether he has acquired domicile and
the attendant right to vote. For a complete list, see Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 797 (1972), and
the authorities cited therein.
11. Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Student Residency Laws, 18 VmL. L. REv.
461, 465 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Student Residency Laws]; see Note, Constitutional
Law-Twenty-Sixth Amendment-Residency Requirements And The Right to Vote, 21 DE
PAuL L. Rav. 843 (1972).
12. Student Residency Laws, supra note 11; see Student Voting, supra note 5.
13. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, reh. denied, 379 U.S. 870 (1964).
14. E.g., Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Ky. 1971); Worden v. Mercer
County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 294 A.2d 233 (1972).
15. 380 U.S. 89 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as Carrington].
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men who had been stationed in Texas from ever acquiring a voting resi-
ence in that state for the duration of their military service. The Court
held that this provision denied petitioner, a member of the armed services
who otherwise would have been eligible to vote in Texas, a fundamental
right in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 6 The Court pointed out that although students at colleges and
universities may be as transient as military personnel, they "are given at
least an opportunity to show the election officials that they are bona fide
residents."'
In Whatley, the state argued that Carrington, which had dealt with a
conclusive presumption, in effect approved the treatment of students as
presumptive nonresidents because this particular presumption was rebut-
table, giving students "at least an opportunity" to establish their claims of
domicile.' This contention was rejected. Although the determining
factor in Carrington was "the conclusiveness of the presumption with
regard to servicemen,' '" a
[t]he Court in Carrington did not purport to evaluate the dis-
tinctions that Texas had made as between members of the
favored class; its reference to the "opportunity" given to stu-
dents ... to prove their claims of residence should be seen only
in contrast to the total disenfranchisement of servicemen, not as
tacit approval of a rebuttable presumption of nonresidency as
applied to students.20
The right to vote is a fundamental right preservative of other basic
rights.21 A state statute that restricts the exercise of such a fundamental
right must be shown to promote a compelling state interest or it is invalid
under the equal protection clause.22 In Whatley, the state advanced the
argument that this "compelling interest" test was met since the provision
in question "preserve[s] the purity of the ballot,"2 an interest that is
expressed in the Texas constitution.24 The Fifth Circuit conceded that
Texas does have a legitimate interest in limiting the right to vote to bona
fide residents and in "guarding against fraudulent evasions of valid
residence requirements.125 However, the court found it "difficult to believe
16, Id. at 96.
17. Id. at 95.
18. 482 F.2d at 1233.
19. Id. at 1234.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1233.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1234.
24. In all elections by the people, the vote shall be by ballot, and the Legislature
shall provide for the numbering of tickets and make such other regulations as may
be necessary to detect and punish fraud and preserve the purity of the ballot box;
and the Legislature shall provide by law for the registration of all voters.
TEx. CONST. art. 6, § 4.
25. 482 F.2d at 1234.
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that a presumption that students are not residents of their college com-
munities is necessary to promote those goals."28
In general, voter residence requirements are defended by the states
on the ground that they serve three legitimate policies:
(1) prevention of fraudulent or double voting;
(2) promotion of a more concerned, interested, and informed elec-
torate; and
(3) identification of the prospective voter in advance of the elec-
tion.27
Traditionally, there has been a popular distrust of student voting
power and what its effect would be on the local college community."
Most of the courts, which have recently decided the question of the
"presumptive nonresidence" of students, have pointed out that this dis-
trust and a fear of a student "takeover" is unfounded. 2 Further, "there
is every reason to believe they might be even better informed on current
issues than other citizens."80 Even if there is some basis for this distrust,
"it is no longer constitutionally permissible to exclude students from the
franchise because of the fear of the way they may vote."'"
Two of the leading cases in the student voting rights area, although
not cited as authority by the Fifth Circuit in Whatley, are Wilkins v.
Bentley8" and Jolicoeur v. Mihaly.8 In Wilkins, the Supreme Court of
Michigan stated that the rebuttable presumption of a student's nonresi-
dence at a school which was created by state statute 4 placed an undue
burden on the student's voting rights. 85 The law was held to deprive stu-
26. Id. (emphasis in original). It is interesting and also puzzling to note, as did the Fifth
Circuit, that one of the original defendants in the case at bar, testifying as the state's chief
election officer, stated unequivocally that the statute in question created a "special classifica-
tion" that served no purpose other than to discourage students from voting. Id.
27. Note, ELECTIONS-Student Voting--Students Residing in University Communi-
ties Must Be Permitted To Register To Vote Without Regard to Future Plans-Worden v.
Mercer County Board of Elections, 61 NJ. 325, 294 A.2d 233 (1972), 4 SETON HALL L. Rv.
329, 340 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ELECTIONS]; Macleod & Wilberding, State Voting
Residency Requirements and Civil Rights, 38 Gao. WasH. L. REv. 93, 94-95 (1969). See also
Student Voting, supra note 5, at 46-53.
28. ELECTIONS, supra note 27, at 335.
29. Even apart from the constitutional question, the possibility of'student bloc voting
has not been proven where a college community actually facilitated student voting.
A recent American Council on Education survey of college freshmen showing that
forty-four per cent considered themselves liberal and twenty per cent moderate con-
servative demonstrates that students would not vote as a solid unit but in fact
fairly approximate the voting patterns of the national electorate.
Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 337-38, 294 A.2d 233, 239 (1972),
quoting Note, Restrictions On Student Voting, 4 U. MicH. J.L. Rzvom 215, 236 (1970).
30. Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 690, 189 N.W.2d 423, 432 (1971).
31. Id. at 693, 189 N.W.2d at 433.
32. 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971).
33. 5 Cal. 3d 565, 488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971).
34. The statute involved was of the typical type that appears In note 9 supra.
35. The court stated that it Is not mandatory that the students demonstrate an absolute
denial of the.right to vote in order to require the state to show a compelling interest. Plain-
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dents of due process88 and equal protection."1 In Jolicoeur, the Supreme
Court of California held that both the twenty-sixth amendment and Cali-
fornia law require that local registrars treat all citizens eighteen years of
age or older alike for all purposes related to voting."5 The registrars were
specifically forbidden from specially questioning the validity of an
affiant's claim of domicile because of his age or occupational status. 9
Thus, the Whatley decision is one of a continuing line of cases recog-
nizing that the student is fully deserving of equal protection of the laws
with regard to his voting rights. "The fundamental importance of the
franchise, as both a symbol and a vital tool of our democracy, requires
that every effort be made to apply uniform standards and procedures to
all qualified voters equally."
40
JAMES S. BIAMNICK
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT FINDS FAULT WITH NO-FAULT
Plaintiff brought an action in the Dade County Circuit Court al-
leging that defendant should be held liable for damages to her car, even
though Florida's no-fault insurance law exempted defendant from tort
liability.1 Plaintiff, whose car had been involved in a collision with defen-
dant's car, alleged that the driver of defendant's car had been negligent
and had been formally charged with failure to yield the right of way.
The recoverable damages were limited to $250, the fair market value of
the car.2 The circuit court dismissed the action on the ground that
Florida's no-fault insurance law, Florida Statutes section 627.738
(1971), exempted defendant from tort liability. This statute provides that
an owner who has elected not to purchase property damage insurance
may maintain an action in tort only if such damage exceeds $550. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, held, reversed and remanded:
Florida Statutes, section 627.738 (1971) is void since it is repugnant
tiffs need only show that a burden has been placed on this precious right in order to avail
themselves of the equal protection clause. Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 684, 189
N.W.2d 423, 429 (1971).
36. Id. at 678, 189 N.W.2d at 426-27.
37. Id. at 694, 189 N.W.2d at 434.
38. Jolicoeur v. Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565, 582, 488 P.2d 1, 12, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697, 708
(1971).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 582, 488 P.2d at 11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
1. FLA. STAT. § 627.738 (1971).
2. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1973). Damages were alleged to be $750, but
the fair market value of the car was only $250. The court noted that plaintiff's damages
were limited to the fair market value of the car, since repair costs could not be recovered
when they exceeded the fair market value of the automobile before the collision. 25 C.J.S.
Damages § 82 (1966); 15 D. BLAsrmIEI, AuToroBmu LAw § 480.1 (3d ed. 1969).
